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In an incomplete market economy, all claims cannot be priced uniquely based on arbitrage.
The prices of attainable claims (those that are spanned by traded claims) can be determined
uniquely, whereas the prices of those that are unattainable can only be bounded. We first show
that tighter price bounds can be determined by considering all possible portfolios of unattainable
claims for which there are bid/offer prices. We provide an algorithm to establish these bounds.
We then examine how a price-taking agent can “package” new assets in order to take advantage
of the incompleteness since the market places a premium on claims that improve its spanning.
In particular, we prove that a firm with a new investment opportunity can maximize its value by
“stripping away” the maximal attainable portion of the cash flow, for which prices are determined
uniquely, and selling the balance to investors at prices that preclude arbitrage. Our framework
has several applications in financial economics to problems ranging from securitization to the
valuation of real options.
1 Introduction
Many of the classic results in modern financial theory were originally derived in the context of
a complete financial market in the sense of Arrow-Debreu. Although this framework has yielded
rich results for a variety of problems in economics, the fact remains that financial markets are, in
fact, incomplete and their incompleteness has implications for many interesting economic issues,
in particular the problem of valuation of assets, real and financial. This paper addresses the issue
of valuation in incomplete markets and the resultant implications for financial decision making, in
general, and securitization, in particular.
The implications of incomplete markets for the valuation of assets can be appreciated by con-
sidering the following illustration. In standard financial theory, assets are generally valued on a
stand-alone basis. Their prices are derived from the capital market on the assumptions that the
cash flows from the real asset can be replicated in the financial market and that all agents are price-
takers with respect to financial claims. This raises the question whether the value of a particular
asset, say a real asset, owned by an agent such as a firm, can be enhanced by undertaking suitable
augmenting or offsetting transactions in the financial markets. It is well-known that in a complete
market, in which claims are traded on all future contingencies, it is not possible to improve the
valuation of the asset by such transactions (see for example, Diamond (1967), Radner (1972) and
Hart (1975)). The answer is not obvious if the market is incomplete, since we can not associate a
unique price with every state-contingent claim. We address this question in this paper.
The problem we pose is a fairly common one, since firms often have opportunities that are unique
to them, and generate future cash flows that cannot be replicated by existing market transactions.
However, firms are typically not large enough to influence the prices of the securities traded in
the market. The question is whether a firm with such a unique opportunity can engage in capital
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market transactions relating to some parts of its future cash flows to enhance its value. We separate
this question into two issues. First, what are the conditions that can be imposed on the price of
an asset in the context of an incomplete capital market to preclude arbitrage between the prices
of the traded claims? Second, given the arbitrage-bounds imposed by the market, how can a
price-taking firm “package” the cash flows from its unique investment opportunity so as to take
advantage of the incompleteness of the market? The answers to these questions would help isolate
the distinct advantage possessed by the firm from owning a particular asset, without abandoning
the standard assumptions of price-taking as well as the assumption of no arbitrage in competitive
capital markets.
In the analysis of financial markets from a pricing perspective, the base case is clearly one
that is complete and has no frictions or transaction costs. There are two points of departure:
the first is to introduce some friction, such as a trading cost, the other is to deal explicitly with
incompleteness. We explore the latter route. Our focus is on the additional value created by a
price-taking firm that takes advantage of the incompleteness of the market and caters to it. It is well
known from valuation theory that in an incomplete market, the value of a real asset cannot always
be uniquely computed from capital market prices, by arbitrage pricing arguments. Hence, it is often
concluded that firms that decide between alternative investments, such as in real assets, cannot
easily determine which choices maximize their value. Our research shows that incompleteness of the
market puts a premium on those assets that offer hedging possibilities, i.e., on assets that improve
the spanning across states. Hence, even though the values of the real assets in question cannot be
uniquely determined, this hedging dimension may restrict the bounds on their prices.
A number of typical problems of valuation in the context of incomplete markets can be analyzed
within our framework. We present below two such examples, and later, in §6, provide numerical
illustrations of each example in the context of our model.
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Example A: Securitization
The two aspects of securitization, pooling and tranching, can be explained by value creation
in incomplete markets, for instance, in the particular case of the market for collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). The assumption here is that the market is incomplete in the sense that some
states associated with poor, mediocre, or good performance by the group of firms whose bonds are
being pooled, cannot be spanned by the available securities in the market. This creates an incentive
for an intermediary to purchase a portfolio (“pool”) of junk bonds and then issue claims against
the pool in various categories (“tranches”), e.g., a high-grade AAA tranche, which has a negligible,
virtually zero, probability of not meeting its promised payment; a medium-grade tranche, say
rated BBB+, which has a low but not negligible probability of such default; and an equity tranche,
which is viewed as risky.1 The question that arises here is what is the optimal pooling and tranching
strategy for the financial institution contracting the purchase of CDOs? In other words, what debt
instruments should be pooled and what tranches should be created to extract the maximum surplus
from the transactions?
Example B. Investment in Real Options
Consider an energy firm that has two alternative investment opportunities in oil exploration,
and can undertake only one of them. Suppose the payoffs from these opportunities depend on a
benchmark such as West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices, and a spread due to the sulfur
content of the oil produced. The first project yields oil with low sulfur content, thus its cash flows
can be perfectly hedged by selling derivative contracts on oil on the benchmark WTI grade. The
second project might yield oil with high sulfur content and there are no matching securities. What
option should the firm select? In addition, suppose that the firm can use the oil to feed two existing
1Typically, there are more than three tranches in a CDO structure, but three would suffice to explain the essential
principles involved.
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refineries that it owns, and that are designed to handle crude with different grades of sulfur content.
Does the ownership of these refineries change the value of the investment in oil exploration? Are
there any synergies involved across the states of the economy by combining the cash flows of the
project with the existing cash flows?
The common features of these examples are: (1) There is an asset with a given set of payoffs in
different states. (2) Since the market is incomplete, the asset cannot be valued in a unique manner.
(3) Some of the asset’s payoffs are spanned by securities traded in the market. Hence, they can
be priced and sold by issuing the corresponding attainable claims in the market. (4) Other payoffs
are not spanned by traded securities. To the extent that these payoffs can be sold within the limits
of market prices, the value of the asset can be enhanced. (5) The valuation of the asset is greater
due to its spanning properties, thus leading to synergistic benefits across states rather than due
to conventional economies of scale/scope within the same states. Our research synthesizes these
common features to obtain results that are applicable in each of these settings.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on incomplete markets
and securitization. Section 3 presents the model setup and assumptions. Section 4 analyzes the
conditions for arbitrage-free trading in the securities market when there exists a ‘thin’ market for
cash flows that are not spanned by the existing securities. Section 5 determines the value of the
firm owning the real asset, and §6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our analysis.
2 Literature Review
We draw upon two strands in the literature in our research. The first is the literature on valuation
of assets when markets are incomplete, i.e., when the set of available securities does not span the
state-space. The second is the literature on securitization, i.e., the issuance of securities in the
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capital market that are backed or collateralized by a portfolio of assets.
2.1 Valuation in Incomplete Markets
The Arrow-Debreu framework was originally developed to study the equilibrium valuation of claims
in a complete market. Over time, the framework has been modified and developed significantly
for analyzing general equilibrium in incomplete markets.2 Despite some progress in this area, the
problem of endogenous asset formation in an incomplete market, such as through making investment
decisions in real assets or introducing new securities, and the valuation of such assets, in particular,
has not been solved satisfactorily so far. To be precise, for a firm making such decisions, the main
issue is how to value an asset, real or financial, that is outside the span of securities that can be
priced exactly.
In an Arrow-Debreu economy, when markets are complete, beliefs and attitudes towards risk do
not affect the valuation of new assets, given the pricing of state-contingent claims in the existing
equilibrium. Therefore, the competitive firm’s investment decisions under the objective of value
maximization are independent of such attitudes and the standard Fisher separation theorem of
valuation of real assets versus their financing holds. However, when markets are incomplete, as
pointed out by Radner (1982), we do not have a clear-cut natural way of comparing net revenues at
different dates and states. Typically, each investor in a firm has a different attitude to a proposed
investment and the unanimity implied by the separation theorem in complete markets no longer
holds. In such a situation, the objective of the firm itself is unclear. Various objectives of the firm
have been proposed under such a situation such that the actions of the firm are consonant with the
value of the firm. A particular objective proposed by Grossman and Hart (1979) (similar to the
2Most of the theory is accessible via the surveys by Radner (1982) and Magill and Shafer (1991) and the more
detailed book by Magill and Quinzii (2002).
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objective studied in Diamond (1967) and Dreze (1974)) is related to our paper. They suggest that
each firm’s objective function be a weighted sum of the shareholders’ private value. If shareholders
have to be unanimous about the plan, this objective reduces to maximization of the value of shares.
In this context, Radner (1982, p. 981) adds that the market-value maximization hypothesis would
require the producer to predict the effect of a choice in production plan on the price equilibrium.
Thus, the producer would no longer be a price-taker. Therefore, one would need a theory of general
equilibrium in monopolistic competition to determine the optimal plan.
Since the theory of equilibrium under incomplete markets does not yield unambiguous results,
research in financial economics has focused on the less restrictive notion of “no arbitrage” to analyze
problems of valuation. Harrison and Kreps (1979) is credited with showing that a no arbitrage price
process under a suitable change of measure can be set equal to the conditional expectation of the
future payoffs. It can also be used as the basis for approximate analysis of equilibrium, as argued by
Ross (1976a) and John (1981). The idea of no arbitrage is more primitive than that of equilibrium
in the financial markets or even valuation, since the existence of arbitrage opportunities implies that
that the economy is not in equilibrium. In fact, the no arbitrage condition helps in searching for
equilibrium under incomplete markets (see, for example, Geanokoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)).
Despite this, the fact remains that when an asset’s payoffs are not spanned by the existing claims in
the market, or more particularly, the returns of an asset are not perfectly correlated with marketed
assets, it is difficult to value the asset using no-arbitrage pricing.
Three different approaches have been adopted for pricing contingent claims in incomplete mar-
kets: through bounds based on no-arbitrage, preference-based approaches that impose restrictions
on the utility functions of consumers, and approximate arbitrage-based arguments. Under the
arbitrage-based approach of Harrison and Kreps (1979), when the market is incomplete, the pric-
ing kernel is not unique - there are several pricing kernels that price marketed securities correctly.
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Since the traded assets do not span the entire state space, there is a multiplicity of stochastic dis-
count factors, under any of which the expected value of future cash flows equals the present price
of a traded asset. Hence, for securities than cannot be spanned by the existing market, there is no
unique price. However, a lower and an upper bound on the value of the security can be obtained
by determining the maximum and minimum prices under the set of pricing kernels—the security
cannot be sold above its upper bound, nor can it be purchased below the lower bound price, without
presenting an arbitrage opportunity.3
In contrast to the above approach, it is possible to restrict investor preferences or return dis-
tributions to get exact prices such as in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model. Another
example of this approach is the literature on option pricing using such preference restrictions.4
These approaches give bounds that are obviously tighter than the no arbitrage bounds, but are less
general, given the nature of the preferences assumed.
Some researchers have criticized both the preference-based and arbitrage-based approaches to
pricing. The preference-based approach, which uses subjective probabilities and the preferences of
the individual decision-maker, is criticized as being too specific and subject to misspecification error.
The arbitrage-based approach, on the other hand, which uses the risk neutral pricing measure, is
criticized for yielding price bounds that are too wide - those that rule out arbitrage opportunities,
but do not rule out “approximate” arbitrage opportunities. Thus, these bounds are considered
too weak to be economically interesting. Recent research has focused on sharpening the price
bounds in an incomplete market, either by imposing economic restrictions in the arbitrage pricing
theory based on the reward-to-risk or Sharpe ratio, or by combining the arbitrage-based and the
3A variant of this approach is to place restrictions using the principle of stochastic dominance, as proposed in the
context of options by Merton (1973), and widely used in setting bounds on the prices of derivative instruments.




The arbitrage-based approach, first formally proposed by Harrison and Kreps (1979), is used as
the starting point of the analysis in the approximate arbitrage based approach. Shanken (1992) de-
fines an investment opportunity with a high, but finite Sharpe ratio as an “approximate arbitrage.”
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) show that a bound on the maximum Sharpe ratio is equivalent to
a bound on the variance of the pricing kernel. Building on this result, Cochrane and Saa-Requejo
(2000) derive sharper bounds on the prices of derivative instruments by ruling out the existence
of investment opportunities with high Sharpe ratios, which they call “good deals”. Many other
restrictions on the set of pricing kernels have been studied in the literature. For example, Snow
(1992) derives restrictions on the q-th moment of the pricing kernel; and Stutzer (1993) presents
an alternative restriction on the entropy of the pricing kernel by restricting the maximum expected
utility attained by a CARA agent.
Bernardo and Ledoit (1999, 2000) argue that bounds on the maximum value of the Sharpe
ratio are insufficient to rule out approximate arbitrage when returns are not Gaussian because
even though such bounds rule out high state prices, they do not rule out low state prices. Thus,
Bernardo and Ledoit alternatively define approximate arbitrage as a zero-cost investment oppor-
tunity with a high ratio of expected gains to expected losses, where the expectations are taken
under a benchmark investor’s risk-adjusted pricing measure. By using duality theory they show
that a restriction on the maximum gain-loss ratio is equivalent to a restriction on the ratio of state
price densities (P/Q) across any two states, and therefore, rules out both high and low state prices,
where, P denotes the risk neutral price density, and Q denotes the risk-adjusted price density of a
benchmark investor. Thus, Bernardo and Ledoit give an alternative method to show that restrict-
ing approximate arbitrage restricts the set of admissible pricing kernels, and thus, gives sharper
price bounds than those obtained by a pure arbitrage-based approach.
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In contrast to the above approaches, we show that the bounds can be substantially sharpened
using no-arbitrage arguments when there are several contingent claims to be priced simultaneously.
In some sense, our approach is between the large and the small in the following sense: the preference
based approach uses the utility function of a single person (small) whereas the competitive no
arbitrage approach assumes an efficient market and several players (large). Our approach is that of
a single seller who works within the no arbitrage prices but sells to multiple buyers. However, an
important assumption of our analysis is related to the previous literature, namely, the price-taking
assumption of the individual seller of claims.
The problem of valuing a new asset that is introduced into an incomplete market goes beyond
the valuation of assets using prices that prevail before the introduction of the new asset. Even in a
complete market, such an action might cause the prices of other assets to change. The assumption
made by us and others is that the firm is a price-taker. This may not necessarily be appropriate
if the firm’s output is a non-negligible proportion of the entire output in the economy.5 A variant
of this assumption is discussed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). They examine unanimity of
shareholders with regard to a production plan when there is spanning but not complete markets.6
The set of production plans of a firm is said to be spanned when any of its plans can be written
as a linear combination of the production plans of other firms. They show that when markets are
incomplete, spanning, in general, does not imply unanimity amongst shareholders when the shares
of the firm can be retraded. They show that unanimity can be obtained when firms behave as
perfect competitors in the production of commodities that form a basis for the spanned space, an
assumption labeled as “competitivity.” Another strand of literature on incomplete markets deals
with the role of financial markets in using options and “supershares” to augment existing markets
5See Hart (1979a), Hart (1979b) and Grossman and Hart (1979) for a discussion.
6Unanimity has been studied extensively in the mean-variance setting. See, for example, Merton and Subrah-
manyam (1974).
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to achieve the allocational efficiency of a complete market.7
Our paper also considers the limits to the monopolistic power of an entrepreneur by restricting
the entrepreneur to act within the set of observed prices. This approach is similar to using the
concept of “viability” as in Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Kreps (1981). A pricing kernel over a set
of attainable consumption vectors is said to be viable for a class of conceivable agents if there is one
agent that prefers a consumption bundle from the given set to all others at the given prices. Harrison
and Kreps show that viability is equivalent to there being an extension of the pricing kernel to the
entire set of consumption bundles, i.e., beyond the attainable set. In our setting, the valuation
of the asset is undertaken within the set of price kernels that price existing securities correctly.
Thus, the owner of the asset behaves monopolistically, but within the restrictions imposed by the
no arbitrage criterion. On the other hand, the magnitude of trading possibilities created by the
asset is assumed to be insignificant so that the pricing kernels do not change. The approach is also
similar to the relative pricing as described by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000), “we are interested
only in the value of a specific payoff, we take as given the prices of other assets without questioning
their fundamental economic determinants, and we want to make as few economic assumptions as
possible. (p. 80)”
2.2 Securitization
Research on securitization has focused on the rationale for the widespread use of pooling and
tranching in the asset-backed securities market. This rationale is explained through three types
of market imperfections: transaction costs, market incompleteness, and information asymmetry.
7Supershares are tranches of the portfolio of all securities in the market. See Ross (1976) and John (1981) for an
analysis of how options on a single portfolio of all the primitive securities can achieve such a fully efficient market.
Hakansson (1978) provides an argument that supershares issued by an entity invested in the market portfolio may
improve the allocational efficiency of the existing market structure.
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Specific examples of securitization include the literature on “supershares” (i.e., tranches of the
portfolio of all securities in the market), primes and scores (i.e., income and capital gains portions
of a stock), and “bull” and “bear” bonds.8
Allen and Gale (1991) examine the incentive of a firm to issue a new security when there are
transaction costs. Their study is motivated by the observation that the first firm to innovate finan-
cially faces a higher cost than imitators. They consider a two-period model with entrepreneurs and
investors. Each entrepreneur owns a risky asset that produces a random return in the second period.
Asset returns are assumed to have symmetric distributions. In the first period, the entrepreneur
issues claims against the returns from the asset. If a firm decides to innovate a new security (which
is simply a partition of its asset returns), the ex-post values of the firm that decides to innovate
and the firms that decide not to innovate will be equal. Thus, there is no value to innovating if the
prices remain the same after innovation and when there is a cost incurred for introducing the new
securities. On the other hand, if the prices change due to the innovation, then there is a mixed
strategy symmetric equilibrium in which each firm computes the value differential from innovating
versus not innovating and acts accordingly. Even if one firm decides to innovate, the prices might
change to make the innovation worthwhile to the firm. If it decides not to innovate, there is still
a probability that one other firm might innovate. Thus, the strategy mixes across these outcomes
and trades off the cost of issuing the security against the benefit from innovating. Allen and Gale
conclude that competition is necessarily ‘imperfect’ if there is to be any incentive to innovate (this
relates back to the observation in Radner (1982)). Our paper shows that this need not be the case
even if prices do not change due to the innovation but when there is a single firm. The firm can
8See Hakansson (1978), and Jarrow and O’Hara (1989) for details. For example, Hakansson (1978) argues that
options or supershares on the market portfolio improve the allocational efficiency of an existing market structure,
even if the market portfolio itself is not efficient.
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partition its asset returns so that they are sold in the most profitable manner. However, the most
profitable manner is constrained by the no-arbitrage condition. We also assume that only the firm
can issue these securities and that they have to be backed by the asset returns to be credible.9 We
only assume that the sum total of the payoffs from the securities issued should be less than or equal
to the random return in the second period.
Several other researchers examine the rationale for pooling and tranching using information
asymmetry between issuers and investors. Pooling is considered beneficial to both an uninformed
issuer and an uninformed investor. The benefit to an uninformed issuer is that it reduces the
issuer’s incentive to gather information (Glaeser and Kallal 1997). The benefit to uninformed
investors is that pooling reduces their adverse selection problem when competing with informed
investors (DeMarzo 2001). In this context, Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that security index baskets
are more liquid than the underlying stocks.
However, DeMarzo (2001) also shows that an informed issuer (or intermediary) does not prefer
pure pooling because it destroys the asset-specific information of the informed issuer. Instead,
an informed intermediary prefers pooling and tranching to either pure pooling or separate asset
sales because pooling and tranching enable the intermediary to design low-risk debt securities that
minimize the information asymmetry between the intermediary and uninformed investors. DeMarzo
calls this the ‘risk diversification effect’ of pooling and tranching. Pooling and tranching are also
beneficial to uninformed investors. For example, Gorton and Pennachi (1990) show that uninformed
investors prefer to split cash flows into a risk-less debt and an equity claim.10
9Ross (1976b) writes, “Furthermore, in general, it is less costly to market a derived asset generated by a primitive
than to issue a new primitive, and there is reason to believe that options will be created until the gains are outweighed
by the set-up costs (p. 76) .
10There is a vast literature on the role of information asymmetry in securitization. See DeMarzo (2001), DeMarzo
and Duffie (1999), and Leland and Pyle (1977) for examples.
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Our paper discusses the rationale for securitization from market incompleteness assuming that
there are no frictions, such as transaction costs, or information asymmetry. However, the results
from our paper are consistent with the results based on information asymmetry. We show that
purely from an arbitrage perspective, pooling and tranching are beneficial to the issuer since they
enable the issuer to construct tranches that maximize the value of unspanned assets in an incomplete
market. We further discuss the issuer’s problem of optimal construction of tranches given that there
are investors with different preferences in the market. In this regard, our results also relate to the
value of options for increasing market efficiency as described in Ross (1976b).
3 Model Setup
We consider a discrete-time Arrow-Debreu economy in which time is indexed as 0 and 1.11 The set of
possible states of nature at time 1 is Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωK}. All agents have the same informational
structure: The true state of nature is unknown at t = 0 and is revealed at t = 1. Moreover, the K
states are a complete enumeration of all possible events of interest, i.e., the subjective probability
of any decision maker is positive for each of these states and adds up to one over all the states.
There is a set of claims traded in the financial market that can be bought or sold by all agents.
The financial market is assumed to be arbitrage-free and frictionless, i.e., there are no transaction
costs associated with the sale, purchase or creation of securities. All agents are price-takers in the
financial market. To keep the analysis uncluttered, we assume that there is no discounting of cash
flows, i.e., the risk-free rate of interest is 0.
In this economy, we introduce a firm (decision maker) that owns an asset, say a real asset, which
is unique to it and provides an income of X(ωk) in each state k at time t = 1. We assume that
11The model described below can be extended to a multi-period setting with some added complexity in the notation.
However, the basic principles and results derived would still obtain.
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the firm is small relative to the size of the economy. Thus, the equilibrium prices of financial assets
currently traded in the market are unaffected by the introduction of the firm. The firm, therefore,
behaves as a price-taker in the financial market. It can undertake the following transactions: (i)
buy and sell claims issued against X, (ii) buy or sell securities in the financial market. Claims
issued against X should be fully backed by X; in other words, their sum should not exceed the
value of X in any state of nature.12
We are primarily interested in how the firm can enhance its value by combining X with the
securities traded in the financial market. There are three possible cases of interest: (1) when the
market is complete and there are no transaction costs, (2) when the market is complete but there
are transaction costs or deadweight costs, such as due to bankruptcy, and (3) when the market is
incomplete. In the first case, the value of proprietary claims X is unique and cannot be enhanced
by transactions in the financial market (see Lemma 3 in §5). In the second case, Allen and Gale
(1991) show that the value of the firm cannot be enhanced by offering new securities against X
when there are transaction costs of issuing these new securities and prices are unaffected by the
issuance of new securities. On the other hand, it is easy to show that when there are deadweight
costs such as those associated with bankruptcy, the firm might prefer to insure against loss in
certain states of nature. Certainly, risk averse owners might prefer to trade their future cash flows
for a time zero profit or even at a small loss. These results establish that interaction between the
cash flows from real and financial assets is certainly possible when there are inefficiencies in the
securities market. In contrast, our paper focuses on the third case, when the financial market is
frictionless but incomplete.
We make the following additional assumption with respect to claims that are not presently
12We do not allow for issue of claims that would permit default in some states, since that would involve complex
questions relating to bankruptcy and renegotiation, which are outside the purview of this paper.
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traded: There are buyers willing to buy and/or sell contingent claims Yi, i = 1, . . . , I in the market
at prices pi.13 These claims could be made up of packages of other securities and state contingent
claims. We refer to them as being traded in a ‘thin’ market. Thus, even though the market is
incomplete, there is demand from individuals who are willing to buy unspanned claims at arbitrage-
free prices. Allen and Gale (1991) present an example that demonstrates the existence of demand for
such claims in an incomplete market. They show that when the market is incomplete, individuals
can have different reservation prices for contingent claims that are not spanned by the existing
securities (also see Ross 1976b). This suggests that there are two classes of securities in the market:
(a) those that are presently traded, and (b) those that can potentially be traded. It should be
emphasized that even though securities in the latter group are not presently traded, we model their
bid and ask prices to be consistent with the arbitrage bounds implied by the former group.
In §4, we determine necessary and sufficient conditions to prevent arbitrage in an incomplete
market when there are prices associated with claims that can potentially be traded. This charac-
terization is essential to determine the distinctive advantage of the subject firm in our model. In
§5, we compute the optimal packaging of X such that the value of the firm is maximized.
4 No-Arbitrage Condition in an Incomplete Market
We begin by defining our notation and restating some standard results from the literature in our
context. Proofs of these results can be found in the literature, well-synthesized by Pliska (1997).
As stated in §3, the securities market is assumed to be arbitrage free. Therefore, there exists a
set, Θ, of risk neutral probability measures over Ω such that all traded claims are uniquely priced.
13We presume that arbitrageurs will take advantage of different bid and ask prices for the same claim across
investors. Thus, after these transactions are exhausted, no claim Yi has different bid and ask prices.
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It is well known that the set Θ is spanned by a finite set of independent linear pricing measures.14
Denote the collection of pricing measures that span Θ as {qj , j = 1, . . . , J}. In particular, if the set
Θ is a singleton then the market is complete, else it is incomplete.
Consider a claim Z in this market that pays Z(ωk) in state k, k = 1, . . . ,K. If the expecta-
tion of Z under q, Eq[Z], is independent of q for all q ∈ Θ (that is, Z is spanned by securities
that are traded in the market), then Z is said to be an attainable claim, else it is said to be an
unattainable claim. We shall use the notation E[Z] for the expected value of attainable claims.
For use below, note that all attainable claims are uniquely priced regardless of whether the market
is incomplete. For any unattainable claim Z, let V −(Z) = max{E[S] : S ≤ Z, S is attainable},
and let S−(Z) = argmax{E[S] : S ≤ Z, S is attainable}. Likewise, let V +(Z) = min{E[S] : S ≥
Z, S is attainable}, and let S+(Z) = argmin{E[S] : S ≥ Z, S is attainable}. V −(Z) and V +(Z) are
well-defined and finite. Also, V −(Z) and V +(Z) may alternatively be defined as infq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)]
and supq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)], respectively.
We establish the following lemma needed in the sequel. It simplifies the computation of V +(Z)
and V −(Z) by recognizing that Θ is the interior of a simplex, and that the values of V +(Z) and
V −(Z) are each realized at an extreme point of this simplex. Since qj ’s span Θ, they represent the
extreme points of the simplex. Thus, V +(Z) and V −(Z) can be computed simply by taking the
maximum and the minimum, respectively, of the expected values of Z under qj ’s. This Lemma is
closely related, but not identical to results in the literature. We state and prove it in the specific
form stated below. All proofs are in the Appendix unless otherwise stated.
14A linear pricing measure is a probability measure that can take a value equal to zero in some state, whereas a
risk neutral probability measure is strictly positive in all states. Thus, the set Θ is the interior of the convex set
spanned by the set of independent linear pricing measures. The maximum dimension of this set equals the dimension
of the solution set to a feasible finite-dimensional linear program, and thus, is finite.
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Lemma 1. V +(Z) = maxj∈J Eqj [Z]. V −(Z) = minj∈J Eqj [Z].
The no arbitrage condition for a single contingent claim Z in an incomplete market is stated as
follows: Let the price of Z at time t = 0 be p. Then this contingent claim presents no arbitrage if
V −(Z) ≤ p ≤ V +(Z). Notice that for attainable claims, V −(Z) = V +(Z) = E[Z]. For our analysis
in §5, we need to extend this definition to encompass arbitrage-free trading with multiple claims in
thin markets, viz., when several unattainable claims are priced in the market simultaneously. We
do this in two steps: Lemma 2 extends the no-arbitrage condition for a single contingent claim to
multiple contingent claims by defining a necessary and sufficient condition for no-arbitrage in an
incomplete market. Theorem 1 gives a verification technique to check the condition in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. To prevent arbitrage in the trading of the Yi’s, it is necessary and sufficient that for
all α ∈ <I , V −(∑αiYi) ≤∑αipi ≤ V +(∑αiYi).
In words, the lemma states that the price of every portfolio that can be constructed using the
available claims should lie between the respective upper and lower bounds to prevent arbitrage.
Example 1A: Consider an incomplete market with K = 5, Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5}, and Θ =
{(x, 0.25 − x, 0.5, y, 0.25 − y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.25, 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.25}. Suppose that there exist agents
who are willing to purchase the contingent claims Y1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) and Y2 = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0). We
have V −(Y1) = 0, V +(Y1) = 0.25, V −(Y2) = 0 and V +(Y2) = 0.25. Thus, according to the standard
condition for arbitrage-free trading, the prices of Y1 and Y2 must each lie between 0 and 0.25 to avoid
an arbitrage. This is because (1,1,0,0,0) is an attainable claim that has value = x+0.25−x = 0.25.
It is also the cheapest attainable claim that is larger than Y1 or Y2. However, these conditions alone
are not sufficient, taken individually, to prevent arbitrage. For example, if the agents are willing to
purchase Y1 and Y2 for p1 = 0.15 and p2 = 0.2, respectively, then it is possible to obtain a sure profit
by purchasing the attainable claim (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) for 0.25, splitting it into the unattainable claims Y1
and Y2, and selling to the respective individuals for a net profit of 0.10. Lemma 2 precludes such
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prices by stating that the no-arbitrage condition must hold not only for Y1 and Y2 individually, but
also for portfolios, i.e.,all linear combinations of Y1 and Y2.
The no-arbitrage condition in Lemma 2 is hard to verify because it must hold for every portfolio
that can be created by varying α. Theorem 1 makes verification easier by converting the portfolio
pricing problem into a pricing problem for the individual Yi’s. It states that the no-arbitrage
condition holds if and only if the claims Yi are priced correctly under at least one pricing measure.
Theorem 1. The no-arbitrage condition of Lemma 2 holds if and only if there exists q ∈ Θ such
that
(i) for each claim i that investors are willing to buy at price pi,
∑
k
q(ωk)Yi(ωk) ≥ pi, (1)
(ii) for each claim i that investors are willing to sell at price pi,
∑
k
q(ωk)Yi(ωk) ≤ pi, (2)
(iii) for each claim i that investors are willing to both buy and sell at price pi,
∑
k
q(ωk)Yi(ωk) = pi. (3)
Given the set of contingent claims Yi with prices pi, in order to verify whether these prices satisfy
the condition of Theorem 1, we can proceed as follows: first we exhaust any obvious arbitrage
opportunities that present themselves when some investors are willing to buy the same claim at a
higher price compared to what others are willing to sell the claim at. Next, we partition the set of
claims that can be bought, sold, or both bought and sold as S1, S2 and S3, respectively. We can
determine whether the prices pi satisfy Theorem 1 by solving the following problem:
P1 : ∃ pij , j = 1, . . . , J such that
∑
j





j pijQj(ωk)Yi(ωk) ≥ pi ∀i ∈ S1
(≤, =) (i ∈ S2, i ∈ S3)
The existence of pij ’s can be established using linear programming.
Theorem 1 gives sharper bounds on the prices of unattainable claims than those obtained by
valuing each claim individually using Lemma 1 because these prices must not only lie between the
values given by the functions V −(·) and V +(·) but also satisfy the additional constraints in Theorem
1. For example, suppose we wish to obtain price bounds for claim YI given prices pi, i = 1, . . . , I−1
for claims Yi, i = 1, . . . , I − 1. We can obtain these price bounds simply by adding the constraints
from problem P1 for claims i = 1, . . . , I − 1 to the pricing problem in Lemma 1. We illustrate the
computation of these bounds in §6.
It is of interest to relate Theorem 1 to the usual condition for no arbitrage price bounds when
there is a single contingent claim-price pair (Y, p) that can be both bought and sold. In that case,
Theorem 1 requires the existence of a risk neutral pricing measure q′ such that Eq′ [Y ] ≥ p as well as
Eq′ [−Y ] ≥ −p. Thus, Eq′ [Y ] = p. This is equivalent to the usual condition because Eq′ [Y ] = p ⇒
infq∈ΘEq[Y ] ≤ p ≤ supq∈ΘEq[Y ]. Notice that the existence of such a probability measure does
not imply that the contingent claim is uniquely priced because its price could be different under
different risk neutral pricing measures, say p′′ = Eq′′ [Y ] and infq∈ΘEq[Y ] ≤ p′′ ≤ supq∈ΘEq[Y ].
Thus, the results in this section can be viewed as an extension to the usual arbitrage pricing
theory: the prices in the thin market stay not only within the bounds imposed by the current prices
for individual attainable claims in the market, but also within the bounds implied by the prices
of other claims in the thin market. Moreover, when operating within the constraints that some
contingent claims Y can only be bought (or sold), the prices of such claims must satisfy a one-sided
constraint. On the other hand, the new idea here is that even though prices of the contingent
claims Yi’s are not unique, they must be correct simultaneously to prevent arbitrage.
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Example 1B: We now continue with the previous example and examine the pricing bounds for
all combinations of securities. According to Theorem 1, to avoid arbitrage with prices p1 = 0.15
and p2 = 0.2, it is necessary that for some x and y, the expectations of Y1 and Y2 under q =
(x, 0.25− x, 0.5, y, 0.25− y) are larger than p1 and p2. That is, x× 1 ≥ 0.15, (0.25− x)× 1 ≥ 0.2.
This is impossible. Further, the range of prices that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1 is given by:
x× 1 ≥ p1, (0.25− x)× 1 ≥ p2, that is, p1 + p2 ≤ 0.25. Thus, given p2 ∈ [0, 0.25], price bounds for
Y1 are (0, 0.25− p2). These bounds are sharper than those obtained from Lemma 1 and obviously
prevents the arbitrage discussed earlier.
Example 2 shows how the condition of Theorem 1 can be checked using the linear program P1
in a more complicated situation.
Example 2: Consider an incomplete market with K = 4, Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, and Θ = {(x +
3y, x− y, 0.5− 2x, 0.5− 2y)} where
0 ≤ x+ 3y ≤ 1
0 ≤ x− y ≤ 1
0 ≤ 0.5− 2x ≤ 1
0 ≤ 0.5− 2y ≤ 1.
Figure 1(a) shows the feasible set of values of x and y obtained by solving the above constraints.
This set is given by triangle ABC with vertices (1/4, 1/4), (0, 0) and (1/4,−1/12). There is a
one-to-one correspondence between these extreme points and the independent pricing measures
that span Θ. Thus, Θ is spanned by the pricing measures q1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), q2 = (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
and q3 = (0, 1/3, 0, 2/3). Figure 1(b) shows the set of admissible pricing kernels (triangle A′B′C′)
corresponding to the feasible values of x and y.
Suppose that there exist individuals willing to purchase the contingent claims Y1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
and Y2 = (0, 1, 0, 0) at prices p1 and p2, respectively. By imposing the arbitrage bounds on these
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claims one at a time, we have
V −(Y1) = 0 ≤ p1 ≤ V +(Y1) = 1,
V −(Y2) = 0 ≤ p2 ≤ V +(Y2) = 1/3.
Similar to Example 1, these bounds are not sufficient to prevent arbitrage. For example, p1 =
1, p2 = 0.2 satisfy these bounds but result in an arbitrage. To see this, buy the claim (1, 1, 1, 1) at
price 1, sell Y1 and Y2 at a total price of 1.2, and throw away the balance of (0,0,1,1).
The necessary and sufficient conditions on p1 and p2 to prevent arbitrage are obtained as in
P1 by adding the constraints x + 3y ≥ p1 and x − y ≥ p2 to set Θ. Notice that in the region
ABC, x − y takes a minimum value of 0 on the line segment AB and a maximum value of 1/3 at
C. Thus, 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/3. Now, if p2 is fixed at a value in this range, then, adding the constraint
x − y ≥ p2 from Theorem 1, we find that the feasible set of pricing measures shrinks from ABC
to the triangle DEC (see Figure 1(a)) with vertices D= (1/4, 1/4 − p2), E= (3/4p2,−1/4p2) and
C= (1/4,−1/12). Accordingly, the value of p1 that satisfies the no-arbitrage condition along with
p2 takes a minimum on the segment CE, and a maximum at D. Thus, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1−3p2. If p1 is also
fixed at a value within this range, then, adding the constraint x+3y ≥ p1, we find that the feasible
set of pricing measures further shrinks to the triangle DFG, where F= (3/4p2+1/4p1, 1/4p1−1/4p2)
and G= (1/4, 1/3p1− 1/12). Figure 1(b) shows the pricing kernels corresponding to triangles DEC
and DFG.
Thus, if the usual bounds are used, the upper bound on the sum of p1 and p2 equals 4/3, whereas
the arbitrage-free upper bound obtained from the conditions 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/3 and 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1− 3p2 is
1.
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5 Valuation of X
This section considers the problem of determining a matching portfolio of securities Y which, when
combined with X, maximizes the value of the firm. We first establish that an enhancement in the
value of the firm is feasible only in an incomplete market.
Lemma 3. If the market is complete, that is, the set Θ contains q as its singleton element, then
the value of X can be enhanced by augmenting it with some contingent claim Y if and only if the
time 0 value of the combined time 1 cash flows from X and Y is not separable in X and Y .
The situation is different when the securities market is incomplete. For example,
Lemma 4. If Θ is not a singleton set then the sum of the minimum value of the asset, X, and the
minimum value of the contingent claim, Y , can be enhanced by combining them.
Proof: The minimum value of the asset is given by minq E[X]. Similarly, the minimum value of
the contingent claim is given by minq E[Y ]. The result follows by noting that
min
q






Remark: Notice that the above inequality can be strict only if Θ is not a singleton set. Thus,
indirectly it also provides a proof that when cash flows are additive and the set Θ is a singleton,
no contingent claim can enhance the value of the asset.
5.1 Determining the Optimal Portfolio
We now consider the problem of maximizing the value of X given that a set of buyers is willing to
purchase claims Yi at prices pi. The prices pi obey the conditions defined in Theorem 1, else there
would be an arbitrage in the existing market.
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The problem is formulated as the following linear program:








αiYi(ωk) ≤ X(ωk) k = 1, . . . ,K (5)∑
k
qj(ωk)X¯(ωk)− z ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , J (6)
z, X¯ unsigned, α ≥ 0. (7)
This linear program maximizes the profit obtained by splitting X in such a way that claims αiYi
are sold to respective buyers at prices αipi and the remaining portion, X¯, is sold in the market at
the most conservative price. Here, X¯ and
∑
i αiYi denote the components into which X is split, z
denotes the price of X¯, and
∑
i αipi is the price of
∑
i αiYi. Constraint (5) ensures that the sum of
X¯ and
∑
i αiYi is smaller than X. It enforces the requirement that claims issued against X should
be backed by X. Constraint (6) computes the price z of X¯. Since z is the most conservative price,
it must be less than or equal to V −(X¯). By Lemma 1, this implies that z must be less than or
equal to the expectation of X¯ under each of the pricing measures qj . Constraint (6) ensures this
condition. By the definition of V −(X¯), this implies that there exists an attainable claim S−(X¯)
which is less than or equal to X¯ under all states of nature and has price z. Thus it is possible to
realize the value z by selling X¯. The objective function of P2 seeks to maximize the sum of the
proceeds from X¯ and the parts of X sold to the buyers in the thin market, viz.,
∑
i αipi.
The following theorem gives the optimal solution to this linear program, and thus, the maximum
value of X.
Theorem 2. Let ΘA ⊂ Θ be the non-empty set of pricing measures that satisfy conditions (i)-(iii)
in Theorem 1 for claims Y1, . . . , YI in the thin market at prices p1, . . . , pI , respectively. Also let
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{qAl, l = 1, . . . , L} denote the set of independent pricing measures that span ΘA. Then the optimal
solution to P2 is given by minq∈ΘA Eq[X], or equivalently, by minlEqAl [X].
According to Theorem 2, the value of X is enhanced by undertaking transactions in the thin
market because ΘA ⊂ Θ so that minq∈ΘA Eq[X] ≥ minq∈ΘEq[X] = V −(X). Further, Theorem 2
does not result in an unbounded solution even though the formulation P1 does not have an upper
bound on α. This is so because the prices pi satisfy the no-arbitrage condition in Theorem 1.
Let XA = argmax{E[W ] : W ≤ X,W is attainable}. The structure of the optimal claims
issued against X can be obtained as follows.





{Eq[X −XA] + Eq[XA]}
= min
q∈ΘA
{Eq[X −XA]}+ V −(X).
The second equality follows because XA is attainable. Thus, we find that the value of the firm is
maximized when the attainable portion of X, XA, is stripped away and sold at E[XA](= V −(X)),
and the value of the remaining cash flows, X −XA is maximized using Yi’s. Notice that XA need
not be unique because the optimal value does not depend on the choice of XA.15
5.2 Application to Securitization
Consider the problem of securitization in an incomplete market. Let there be J originators, Xj
denote the cash flows per unit of the debt obligations of originator j, and cj denote the price
at which originator j seeks to sell its cash flows to the intermediary. We define pooling as the
set of transactions by which a financial intermediary purchases a set of cash flows from one or
15To see this, let X ′A be an alternative attainable claim such that X
′
A ≤ X and E[X ′A] = V −(X). Then
minq∈ΘA Eq[X] = minq∈ΘA{Eq[X −X ′A] + Eq[X ′A]} = minq∈ΘA{Eq[X −X ′A]}+ V −(X) = minq∈ΘA{Eq[X −XA] +
Eq[XA −X ′A]}+ V −(X) = minq∈ΘA{Eq[X −XA]}+ V −(X).
24
more originators, and sells attainable securities backed by the combined cash flows in the financial
market. Let X =
∑
j βjXj denote one unit of the pooled asset, where the vector β = (β1, . . . , βJ)
denotes the proportion in which the debt obligations of the originators are combined together in
the pool. Note that
∑
j βj = 1 and βj ≥ 0 for all j. Also note that the value of pooling is, by
definition, equal to V −(X)−∑j βjcj .
We define tranching as the creation of securities backed by the pooled asset to be sold in the thin
market, i.e., to buyers of Y1, . . . , YI . Let αi denote the number of units of claim Yi tranched from
one unit of the pooled asset X, and let α = (α1, . . . , αI). Applying Theorem 2, the incremental
value of tranching is given by minq∈ΘA Eq[X].
We now specify the pooling and tranching strategy as (α, β). The financial intermediary’s
problem is to determine α and β such that the profit per unit of the pooled asset is maximized.
This problem is formulated as the following linear program:














βjXj(ωk) k = 1, . . . ,K (9)∑
k
qj(ωk)X¯(ωk)− z ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , J (10)∑
j
βj = 1 (11)
z, X¯ unsigned, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0. (12)
Notice that this problem is similar to problem P2 defined in §5.1. In P2, the asset X is given
and we seek to maximize its value by splitting it into various tranches. In comparison, in P3, we
seek to both construct the optimal pooled asset and split it into tranches. Constraints (9)-(10) are
analogous to constraints (5)-(6) in P2, and constraint (11) is added to ensure that β corresponds
to a single unit of the pooled asset.
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Let ΘA be as defined in Theorem 2 and ΘB ⊂ Θ be the set of pricing measures satisfying
Theorem 1 for claimsXj priced at cj . Theorems 1 and 2 yield the following conditions characterizing
when there is value in pooling by itself (without tranching) and when there is value in pooling
followed by tranching.
Corollary 1. (i) If ΘB is empty, i.e., if for every q ∈ Θ, there exists j such that cj < Eq[Xj ], then
there is value in pooling by itself.
(ii) If ΘB is non-empty and ΘA
⋂
ΘB = ∅, then there is no value in pooling, but there is value
in pooling and tranching.
(iii) If ΘA
⋂
ΘB 6= ∅, then there is value in neither pooling nor tranching.
Here, if ΘB is empty, then by Theorem 1, some combination of claims Xj can be assembled
to provide risk-free profit. Thus, there is value in pooling by itself (Case (i)). This value can be
obtained by solving the linear program P3 setting α = 0. Note that ΘB could be empty even when
the prices of the claims Xj are within the bounds obtained by evaluating them individually. When
ΘB is not empty, then there is no combination possible under which an arbitrage can be created.
But if ΘB has no element in common with ΘA, then once again Theorem 1 can be applied to show
that there must be an arbitrage among X1, . . . , XJ and Y1, . . . , YI (Case (ii)). The optimal pooling
and tranching strategy can again be obtained by solving P3. Let X be the weighted combination of
X1, . . . , XJ that gives the optimal pooled asset. From Theorem 2, the profit per unit of the pooled
asset is given by minq∈ΘA Eq[X]−
∑
j βjcj . In Case (iii), the maximum value of X, minq∈ΘA Eq[X],




This section presents numerical illustrations of Examples A and B in §1.
6.1 Securitization
Consider a single-period economy with state-space, Ω = Ω1×Ω2, where Ω1 = {1, 2, 3} and Ω2 = {a,
b, c} are information sets. At time t = 0, the market can contract only on the information set Ω1.
The set Ω2 is verifiable at time t = 1 but not contractable at t = 0.
Let there be three securities traded in this economy, S1 with unit payoffs in states {1a, 1b, 1c}
and 0 in the remaining states, S2 with unit payoffs in states {2a, 2b, 2c} and 0 in the remaining
states, and S3 with unit payoffs in states {3a, 3b, 3c} and 0 in the remaining states. Let the prices
of these securities be 0.34, 0.36 and 0.30, respectively. These securities determine the set of pricing
kernels, Θ, feasible for the economy under no-arbitrage trading. Thus, we have
q1a + q1b + q1c = 0.34,
q2a + q2b + q2c = 0.36,
q3a + q3b + q3c = 0.30.
Consider two firms, j = 1, 2, in this economy with debt obligations, X1 and X2. The payoffs
per unit of these obligations at time t = 1 are as shown in Table 1. The bounds on the prices of
each unit of X1 and X2 are obtained by using Lemma 1 as follows:
V −(X1) = 0, V +(X1) = 2 · 0.34 + 2 · 0.36 + 2 · 0.30 = 2.00,
V −(X2) = 0, V +(X2) = 1 · 0.34 + 4 · 0.36 + 1 · 0.30 = 2.08.
Suppose that firm 2 is willing to sell one unit of its debt obligations for c2 = 0.15. Then,




1 0 1 2
2 0 2 0
3 0 1 2
Firm 2
a b c
1 1 0 0
2 1 0 4
3 1 0 0
Table 1: Debt obligations of firms 1 and 2 at t=1
obtained as follows:
max(or min) q1b + 2q1c + 2q2b + q3b + 2q3c
such that
q1a + q1b + q1c = 0.34,
q2a + q2b + q2c = 0.36,
q3a + q3b + q3c = 0.30,
q1a + q2a + 4q2c + q3a ≤ 0.15 (from Theorem 1),∑
k∈Ω
qk = 1,
qk ≥ 0, for all k ∈ Ω.
Thus,
V −(X1|c2) = 1.06, V +(X1|c2) = 2.00. (13)
We now illustrate the application of Corollary 1 to pooling and tranching.
Benefits of Pooling. Suppose that firm 1 is willing to sell one unit of its debt obligations for
c1 = 0.80. Since this price lies outside the bounds in (13), by Theorem 1, ΘB, is empty. Therefore,
by Corollary 1, there is value in pooling the payoffs of the two firms. A naive pooling strategy is
to pool the debt obligations in the ratio 1:1. This strategy yields a profit of 0.025 per unit of the
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pooled asset. However, this strategy is not optimal. The optimal pooling strategy is obtained by
solving the linear program P3 setting α = 0. We find that the optimal strategy involves pooling
X1 and X2 in the ratio 1:2. The price of the pooled asset, X = X1/3+2X2/3, has a lower bound of
V −(X) = 0.68. Thus, it is possible for a financial intermediary to construct one unit of the pooled
asset X at a cost of 11/30 (= (0.80 + 0.30)/3), and sell its attainable portion in the market for
V −(X). (The attainable portion of X consists of 0.5S1 + S2 + 0.5S3.) Thus, pooling results in a
net per unit profit of 94/300 (= 0.68− 11/30).
If c2 = 0.15, pooling has value as long as c1 < V −(X1|c2) = 1.06. When c1 becomes larger than
1.06, then ΘB is not empty so that, by Corollary 1, pooling by itself has no value.
Benefits of Pooling and Tranching. Now suppose that there exist customers in the financial
market willing to purchase risky claims at prices within the arbitrage bounds. Let there be four
classes of investors, i = 1..4, willing to purchase the four claims Yi shown in Table 2 at prices pi
equal to 0.20, 0.50, 0.30 and 0.40, respectively. It can be verified that these prices are consistent
according to Theorem 1 to prevent arbitrage.
It is possible for the financial intermediary to tranche the remaining portion of the pooled
obligations (after selling the attainable portion) to these investors at the best available price.
Thus, we now solve the linear program P3 to find the optimal pooling and tranching strategy.
Here, αi, i = 1..4, represent the number of units of Yi sold to investor class i, αi, i = 5..7, represent
the number of units of traded securities (attainable claims) tranched out to achieve V −(X), and
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β1, β2 represent the proportion in which the obligations of the two firms are pooled together.16
max 0.2α1 + 0.5α2 + 0.3α3 + 0.4α4 + 0.34α5 + 0.36α6 + 0.3α7 − 0.80β1 − 0.15β2
such that
α5 ≤ β2 state 1a
α5 ≤ β1 state 1b
α2 + α3 + α5 ≤ 2β1 state 1c
α6 ≤ β2 state 2a
α1 + α3 + α6 ≤ 2β1 state 2b
α1 + α2 + α3 + 3α4 + α6 ≤ 4β2 state 2c
α7 ≤ β2 state 3a
α7 ≤ β1 state 3b
α2 + 2α4 + α7 ≤ 2β1 state 3c
β1 + β2 = 1
α1, . . . , α4 ≥ 0, α5, . . . , α7 unsigned, β1, β2 ≥ 0.
If β = (5/9, 4/9) is used for pooling, then two candidate feasible solutions to the LP are
α = (2/3, 2/3, 0, 0, 4/9, 4/9, 4/9) and α = (0, 0, 2/3, 2/9, 4/9, 4/9, 4/9). The former solution turns
out to be optimal. The total per unit profit to the financial intermediary after pooling and tranching
16The linear programs P1,P2,P3 were formulated in earlier sections assuming that the linear pricing measures
that span the set Θ are known explicitly. Alternatively, these linear programs can also be formulated when the set
Θ is not known explicitly but the traded securities that determine the set Θ are given. Here, we use the alternative
formulation since S1, S2, S3 are given. The variables αi, i = 5..7, give the attainable claims tranched from the pooled
asset. They are unsigned since the attainable claims can be both bought and sold.
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Investors i = 1
a b c
1 0 0 0
2 0 1 1
3 0 0 0
Investors i = 2
a b c
1 0 0 1
2 0 0 1
3 0 0 1
Investors i = 3
a b c
1 0 0 1
2 0 1 1
3 0 0 0
Investors i = 4
a b c
1 0 0 0
2 0 0 3
3 0 0 2
Table 2: Demand for unattainable claims by different investor classes at t=1
is: 4/9 (from the sale of attainable claims) + 14/30 (from the sale to investor classes 1 and 2)
−5/9c1 − 4/9c2 = 0.40, where c1 = 0.80 and c2 = 0.15.
Further, we find that if c2 = 0.15 and 1.06 ≤ c1 < 1.56, then ΘB is not empty and ΘA
⋂
ΘB is
empty. In this case, pooling by itself has no value but pooling with tranching has value.
No benefit from pooling and tranching. When c2 = 0.15 and c1 ≥ 1.56, then ΘA
⋂
ΘB is
not empty. Thus, there cannot be arbitrage because both prices are high enough to prevent any
advantage from pooling and tranching.
Figure 2 shows the ranges of values of c1 and c2 illustrating the three cases in Corollary 1. The
range where pooling by itself has value is represented by the region below the curve GHI. The range
for which pooling by itself has no value but pooling with tranching has value is represented by the
region between the curves ABCDEF and GHI. Within this region, tranching of the obligations of
firm 1 without pooling has value to the left of the line c1 = 0.28. Tranching of the obligations of
firm 2 without pooling never has value. The region above and to the right of the curve ABCDEF
represents the range of values for which neither pooling nor tranching has value. The optimal
pooling and tranching strategy varies in the region below ABCDEF. The optimal pooling ratio
takes the following values depending on c1 and c2: (1:0), (2:1), (5:4) or (1:2). The optimal tranching
strategy varies accordingly.
31
6.2 Investment in Real Options
The data for this illustration are identical to those in Example 2 in §4. To the economy in that
example, we introduce a firm with a choice of two production plans, for example, two alternative
investments in oil exploration as discussed in Example B in §1. The first plan yields cash flows
X1 = (1, 0, 1/2, 3/2) and the second plan yields cash flows X2 = (3/2, 1, 1/4, 3/4). X1 is spanned
by the securities market and has a unique price of 1 (i.e., the same price under the three pricing
kernels, q1, q2 and q3). However, X2 is not spanned by the securities market. Using the values of
qj ’s computed earlier and applying Lemma 1, we find that V −(X2) = 0.5 and V +(X2) = 1.5. It
also follows from Theorem 2 that buying derivative instruments on the financial market will not
enhance the value of X2. Thus, in the absence of any buyers for unattainable claims, the firm might
choose plan X1 over X2.
Now suppose that there exist individuals willing to buy claims Y1 = (1, 0, 0, 0) and Y2 =
(0, 1, 0, 0) (defined earlier) at prices p1 = 0.34 and p2 = 0.2, respectively. Note that the prices
of Y1 and Y2 satisfy the no-arbitrage condition computed in Example 2 in §4 (0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1/3, 0 ≤
p1 ≤ 1 − 3p2). Referring to Figure 1(b), the set of feasible probability measures given p1 and p2
correspond to the triangle D′F′G′. Substituting the values of p1 and p2, the extreme points of this
triangle yield the following probability measures:
qD′ = (1− 3 · 0.2) · q1 + 0 · q2 + 3 · 0.2 · q3
= 0.4q1 + 0.6q3
= (0.4, 0.2, 0, 0.4),
qF ′ = (0.34, 0.20, 0.03, 0.43),
qG′ = (0.66, 0.34/3, 0, 0.68/3).
By Theorem 2, the optimal value of X2 is given by the minimum value of X2 under the restricted
32
set of probability measures, ΘA, given by the triangle D′F′G′. Since the extreme points of this
triangle are known, we apply Lemma 1 to obtain minq∈ΘA Eq[X]. We have,
EqD′ [X2] = 0.4 · 3/2 + 0.2 · 1 + 0 · 1/4 + 0.4 · 3/4 = 1.1,
EqF ′ [X2] = 1.04,
EqG′ [X2] ' 1.273.
Thus, the optimal value ofX2 is 1.04. It is obtained by stripping the attainable claim (1/2, 0, 1/4, 3/4),
selling it for V −(X1), and selling one unit each of Y1 and Y2 at prices 0.34 and 0.2, respectively.
Thus, the value of X1 is enhanced by finding buyers willing to purchase Y1 and Y2. This changes
the optimal decision of the firm.
Relating to Example B in §1, note that options X1 and X2 could represent the two opportunities
for oil exploration. X1 corresponds to payoffs from oil with low sulfur content, which can be hedged
perfectly using derivative instruments on the benchmark WTI grade. X2 represents payoffs from
oil with high sulfur content, which cannot be hedged perfectly in this manner. Y1 and Y2 represent
investment in oil refineries that are capable of processing oil with different grades of sulfur. The
presence of Y1 and Y2 puts a premium on oil with high sulfur content and enhances the value of
the firm.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
It is well known from the previous literature that when markets are incomplete, it is not possible
to compute all asset prices in a unique manner using arbitrage principles since some states are
not spanned by traded claims. Attainable claims have unique prices, whereas only bounds can be
established for the others. Hence, it is difficult for firms or investors to establish the optimality of
their asset choices. Our paper adds to this literature by examining how incompleteness causes the
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market to place a premium on assets that augment the spanning of the market by existing traded
claims.
In particular, we demonstrate that a firm that has an opportunity to invest in an asset can
maximize its value by stripping away the maximal attainable portion of the pool of claims for
which market prices can be readily established. The remaining part of the cash flows is packaged
and sold to willing agents at prices that do not create arbitrage. Our framework and results have
several applications to common financial problems relating to the valuation of assets, real and
financial. We discuss two such problems, one relating to mergers and the other to securitization.
It has been documented in the academic and practitioner literature that the synergies from a
merger of two companies may come from several sources, economies of scale or scope from their
operations, improvement in their debt capacity, etc. All these explanations deal with the benefits
created in individual states of nature where the cash flow of the combined firm are larger than the
sum of the cash flows of the parts taken separately. We provide a different rationale. We argue
that if the merger produces synergies across states rather within states, it may increase the span
of the market by creating new claims as described above.
Another application is the area of securitization, discussed in detail in the example in the text.
In this problem, our analysis provides guidance in terms of the optimal combination of securities
that can be pooled and tranched from a universe of available securities, so as to maximize the
benefit to the financial intermediary that designs and implements the structure.
Our paper also provides a plausible hypothesis for the eventual completion of markets. We show
that in an incomplete market, firms have an incentive to produce assets X that are not spanned
by the market. The inclusion of X expands the set of agents willing to trade unattainable claims
Yi, and tightens the bounds on their prices. Thus, incrementally, the market is brought closer
to completeness. Finally, our approach can be applied within either the preference-based or the
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approximate arbitrage based pricing approach to further sharpen the price bounds given by those
methods.
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Appendix






qj(ωk)Z(ωk) j = 1, . . . , J
z unsigned.
If z ≥∑k qj(ωk)Z(ωk) for all j, then ∑j δjz ≥∑j∑k δjqj(ωk)Z(ωk) for all δj ≥ 0,∑j δj = 1.
Thus, z ≥ supq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)]. Therefore, the optimal solution must be greater than or equal to
V +(Z). On the other hand, z = maxj∈J Eqj [Z] is a feasible solution to the linear program. But
maxj∈J Eqj [Z] ≤ supq∈ΘEq[Z(ωk)]. Thus, V +(Z) = maxj∈J Eqj [Z]. Similarly, it can be shown
that V −(Z) = minj∈J Eqj [Z]. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. If, for some α ∈ <I , ∑αipi > V +(∑αiYi), then it is possible to create
an arbitrage position by purchasing the attainable claim S+(
∑







αipi. Thus, the inequality is necessary. The proof of




αipi is similar. Moreover, the inequalities are sufficient because for
the establishment of an arbitrage position, we must have that for some α ∈ <I , ∑αipi lies outside






Proof of Theorem 1. We assume that αi ≥ 0 for all i. This is a technical assumption required to
facilitate the proof. It does not result in a loss of generality. In particular, it does not restrict short
sales, because if there exists a contingent claim Yi that agents are willing to both buy and sell at price
pi, then this claim can be represented by two claim-price pairs (Yi, pi) and (Yj , pj) = (−Yi,−pi).
Thus, we need to prove Theorem 1 only for condition (i).











αipi ≤ V +(
∑
αiYi).
An alternative proof of sufficiency is obtained using linear programming. This also provides the









αiYi(ωk) = 0 k = 1, . . . ,K (15)
K∑
k=1
qj(ωk)Y (ωk)− Z ≤ 0 j = 1, . . . , J (16)
Y (ωk) unsigned for all k, Z unsigned, αi ≥ 0 for all i. (17)
This linear program maximizes the profit that any agent in the market can make by purchasing
an attainable claim, splitting it into components αiYi, and selling them to the respective buyers at
prices αipi. Constraint (15) computes the portfolio Y by adding up the cash flows αiYi for all i.
Constraint (16) computes the cost Z of creating Y from the securities traded in the market. Since
Y may not be attainable, the minimum cost of creating Y from the securities traded in the market
is equal to V +(Y ). This is so because, by the definition of V +(Y ), there exists an attainable claim
40
S+(Y ) which is greater than or equal to Y in all states of nature and has price V +(Y ). Thus,
Z must be greater than or equal to V +(Y ). Applying Lemma 1, this is so if Z is larger than
the expected value of Y under each of the pricing measures qj . Therefore, we get the constraints
(16). The objective function of PL represents the amount of profit that can be made by purchasing










αipi. Fix α at this value. Under this assumption, we get an arbitrage by
purchasing the attainable claim S+(
∑
i αiYi) at Z and selling
∑
i αiYi at price
∑
i αipi. Therefore,
PL is unbounded. Thus, by the strong duality theory, the dual of PL is infeasible. The dual
program, denoted DL, is shown below. Here, qk and pij are the dual variables corresponding to









pijqj(ωk) = 0 k = 1, . . . ,K (20)
J∑
j=1
pij = 1 (21)
qk unsigned, pij ≥ 0. (22)
Here, constraints (20)-(22) imply that q is a pricing measure in set Θ that is obtained by taking a
convex combination of qj ’s with weights pij . Constraints (19) hold if the expectation of Yi computed
under the measure q is smaller than pi for each i. Thus, constraints (19)-(22) are equivalent to (1).
Thus, the infeasibility of DL implies that there does not exist any q ∈ Θ such that (1) holds for




i αipi for any α, then there does not exist any q ∈ Θ such that
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(1) holds for all i.
Necessity: Note that PL is always feasible and Z = αi = 0 is a feasible solution. Therefore, if
there is no arbitrage, then Z ≤ ∑i αipi for all α. Thus, PL has an optimal solution equal to 0.
This implies that DL also has an optimal solution equal to 0. The optimal solution of DL gives a
q ∈ Θ such that (1) holds for all i. 2
Proof of Lemma 3. The only if part is obvious since it can be easily shown that if the time 0
value of the combined time 1 cash flows from X and Y is separable in X and Y , then the value of
X cannot be enhanced by augmenting it with Y .
The if part follows from assuming that the time 0 value of the combined cash flows is a function,
g(X,Y ). But then, the time zero value of a combination of X and Y must account for the fact
that the decision maker has to acquire the contingent claim at time 0. Due to the fact that q is
the unique risk neutral probability measure, the time 0 fair price of the contingent claim is Eq[Y ].
Thus, the “net” value of the cash flows at time zero equals g(X,Y )−Eq[Y ] for all Y . In particular,
g(X,Y )− Eq[Y ] = g(X, 0)− Eq[0].
Therefore,
g(X,Y ) = g(X, 0) + Eq[Y ].
2










µjqj(ωk) = 0 k = 1, . . . ,K (24)∑
j
µj = 1 (25)∑
k
λkYi(ωk) ≥ pi i = 1, . . . , I (26)
λk, µj ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . ,K. (27)
Here, λk and µj are the dual variables corresponding to the constraints (5) and (6), respectively.
Observe from constraints (24) and (25) that λ is a pricing measure in Θ. Also, from constraint
(26), λ satisfies (1) in Theorem 1. Thus, λ ∈ ΘA. Since Theorem 1 holds, the dual problem DX
has at least one feasible solution. Further, the primal problem P2 is also feasible since X¯ = 0, z =
0, α = 0 is a feasible solution. Thus, both the primal and dual problems have optimal solutions.
These solutions are equal by weak duality theory.
Also note that the objective function of DX is the expectation of X under λ. Therefore, the
optimal solution of DX (and of P2) is equal to minq∈ΘA Eq[X]. By Lemma 1, the optimal solution
is further equal to minlEqAl [X]. 2
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) From Theorem 1, if ΘB is empty, then there exist weights βj ≥ 0
such that
∑
j βjcj < V
−(
∑





j βjcj > 0 so that there is value
to pooling claims Xj in the proportion given by βj for all j. Conversely, if ΘB is not empty, then
for all βj ≥ 0, we have that
∑
j βjcj ≥ V −(
∑














i αiYi). Thus, there is value in pooling the claims {Xj}






(iii) Let q ∈ ΘA
⋂
ΘB. Then, from Theorem 1,
∑
j βjcj ≥ Eq[
∑
j βjXj ] for all β ≥ 0. Further,
from Theorem 2, the value of
∑
j βjXj is less than or equal to Eq[
∑
j βjXj ]. Thus, there is no value
in pooling or tranching. 2
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The figure illustrates the feasible set of values of x and y in Example 2. The triangle ABC 
represents the feasible set in the absence of information about thinly traded claims. When 
individuals are willing to buy claims Y2 (or Y1 and Y2), the set shrinks to DEC (or even further to 
DFG).
Coordinates of the labeled vertices:
A = (1/4, 1/4), B = (0, 0), C = (1/4, -1/12), D = (1/4, 1/4 – p2),
E = (3/4 p2, – 1/4 p2), F = (3/4 p2 + 1/4 p1, 1/4 p1 – 1/4 p2), G = (1/4, 1/3 p1 – 1/12).
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The figure illustrates the feasible set of pricing kernels in Example 2. The axes represent the 
independent pricing kernels that span Θ. Points in the region A’B’C’ represent all feasible 
pricing kernels as linear combinations of the independent pricing kernels when there is no 
information about thinly traded claims. This set shrinks to D’E’C’ when individuals are willing to 
buy claim Y2 at price p2, and further shrinks to D’F’G’ when individuals are willing to buy Y1 and 
Y2 at prices p1 and p2, respectively. Sets A’B’C’, D’E’C’ and D’F’G’ correspond to ABC, DEC 
and DFG, respectively, in Figure 1(a).
The coordinates of the labeled vertices are:
A’ (1, 0, 0), B’ (0, 1, 0), C’ (0, 0, 1), D’ (1-3p2, 0, 3p2),
E’ (0, 1-3p2, 3p2), F’ (p1, 1-p1-3p2, 3p2), G’ (p1, 0, 1-p1).
For example, F’ corresponds to the pricing kernel: 
p1*Q1 + (1-p1-3p2)*Q2 + 3p2*Q3 = (p1, p2, 1/2-p1/2-3p2/2, 1/2-p1/2+p2/2).
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Figure 2: Value of securitization in the example in §6.1


















0 0.5 1 1.5 2
B
c1 = 0.28
2c1 + c2 = 2.5
5c1 + 4c2 = 8.2
c1 + c2 = 1.7
c1 + 2c2 = 1.86
c1 + c2 = 1
c1 + 2c2 = 1.36
A (0.28, ∞) B (0.28, 1.94) C (0.6, 1.3) D (1.4, 0.3) E (1.54, 0.16)
F (1.86, 0) G (0, 0.68) H (0.64, 0.36) I (1.36, 0).
In the region below the curve GHI, pooling by itself has value. In the region between 
ABCDEF and GHI, pooling by itself has no value but pooling with tranching has value. 
Tranching of the obligations of firm 1 without pooling has value to the left of the line c1
= 0.28. Tranching of the obligations of firm 2 without pooling never has value. In the 
region above and to the right of the curve ABCDEF, neither pooling nor tranching has 
value.
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